Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and their Democratic Foundations by Albert, Richard
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
10-2017
Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and their
Democratic Foundations
Richard Albert
Boston College Law School, richard.albert@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Albert. "Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and their Democratic Foundations." Cornell International Law Journal 50, no.2
(2017): 169-198.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-2\CIN201.txt unknown Seq: 1  2-OCT-17 9:31
Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and
their Democratic Foundations
Richard Albert†
The present fascination with the global phenomenon of an unconstitu-
tional constitutional amendment has left open the question whether a con-
stitution can be unconstitutional. To declare an entire constitution
unconstitutional seems different in both kind and degree from invalidating
a single amendment for violating the architectural core of a constitution,
itself undoubtedly an extraordinary action. In this Article, I illustrate and
evaluate four different conceptions of an unconstitutional constitution.
Each conception draws from a different constitution currently in force
around the world, specifically the Constitutions of Canada, Mexico, South
Africa and the United States. Despite their unconstitutionality in different
senses of the concept, each constitution is nonetheless rooted in demo-
cratic foundations. The strength of these foundations, however, varies as to
each.
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I. An Unconstitutional Constitution?
The most fascinating cluster of questions in comparative public law
today is whether, on what grounds, and by whom a constitutional amend-
ment may be declared unconstitutional.1  In some countries, for instance
India, Supreme or Constitutional Courts have developed the “basic struc-
ture” doctrine to invalidate, on substantive grounds, a constitutional
amendment that has nonetheless met all of the textually-entrenched proce-
dural requirements for formal constitutional change.2  In other countries,
most notably Turkey, high courts are constrained by the constitutional text
to review the constitutionality of amendments on procedural grounds
alone.3  Elsewhere, namely in France, the prevailing culture of popular sov-
ereignty validates all formal amendments that have satisfied the procedural
strictures in the constitution and therefore does not recognize the possibil-
ity of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.4
Lost in our focus on the constitutionality of an amendment has been
the equally fascinating cluster of similar but distinguishable questions
whether, on what grounds, and by whom an entire constitution may be
declared unconstitutional.5  The two sets of questions are related insofar as
1. For recent accounts of this puzzle, see YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS (2017); Richard Albert,
Amendment and Revision in the Unmaking of Constitutions, in EDWARD ELGAR HANDBOOK
ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION-MAKING (David Landau & Hanna Lerner, eds., forthcom-
ing 2017); Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (Andra´s Koltay,
ed., 2015); Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Lim-
ited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606
(2015); Yaniv Roznai, The Theory and Practice of “Supra-Constitutional” Limits on Consti-
tutional Amendments, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557 (2013); Carlos Bernal, Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: An Analysis of the Justification
and Meaning of Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 339 (2013);
Ga´bor Halmai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Constitutional Courts as
Guardians of the Constitution?, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 182 (2012); Aharon Barak, Unconsti-
tutional Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV. 321 (2011).
2. See Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 206; Kesavananda Bharati
Sripadagalvaru v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India); Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967)
2 SCR 762.
3. TURKEY CONST., pt. IV, tit. I, art. 178(1)– (2) (1982).
4. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 92-312DC,
Sept. 2, 1992, Rec. 76 (Fr.). The same is true in the United States with respect to the
federal constitution. See Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J. L. &
JURIS. 5, 32– 38 (2009) (though not necessarily with respect to the constitutions of the
subnational states). See Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in Constitutional
Amendment, 69 ARK. L. REV. 217 (2016).
5. The most important exception is Gary Jacobsohn’s field-shaping paper about
unconstitutionality in India and Ireland, though he addresses more squarely the idea of
an unconstitutional constitutional amendment than an unconstitutional constitution.
See Gary Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative Perspective, 4 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 460 (2006).
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both must overcome the same first-order objection that denies there can
ever be any democratically legitimate foundation for declaring an amend-
ment unconstitutional.6  Yet these two sets of questions are nevertheless
different both in degree and kind because the possibility of declaring an
entire constitution unconstitutional strikes more squarely at the core
meaning of constitutional democracy and at what democracy requires in
order to legitimate the creation of a new constitution.  While there may
exist reasonable arguments for invalidating certain constitutional amend-
ments on substantive, procedural, or hybrid grounds,7 there is a much less
well-defined roadmap for declaring an entire constitution unconstitutional.
The question whether a constitution can be unconstitutional risks
being misunderstood as implausible, sacrilegious or subversive.  A strict
formalist might question how a constitution can be unconstitutional if it
has already been properly ratified.  From the perspective of constitutional
veneration, the claim of sacrilege is rooted in disbelief that our constitution
could ever be unconstitutional.  A foundationalist view, on the other hand,
presupposes the constitutionality of the constitution because all other laws
derive from it; without a valid constitution there is no generative source of
authoritative law, and this simply cannot be.  None of these three
responses on its own nor collectively is a satisfactory answer to the ques-
tion whether an amendment can be unconstitutional, if only because as a
matter of descriptive reality courts commonly invalidate amendments.8  It
was once an extraordinary action to invalidate a single amendment for vio-
lating the architectural core of the constitution but its increasing frequency
has today made it a relatively ordinary fact of constitutional life.
Of course, a sham constitution is unconstitutional in the liberal demo-
cratic sense,9 a pathology that calls to mind the familiar problem of
entrenching a constitution without rooting the text in a culture of constitu-
tionalism.10  But I am interested here only in democratic constitutions.
Our point of departure is the multiplicity of meanings of unconstitutional-
ity, a concept that runs along at once competing and complimentary axes
of constitutional formality, constitutional values, constitutional democracy,
and constitutional legitimacy.  In this Article, I develop these distinguisha-
ble meanings of unconstitutionality to illustrate four conceptions of an
6. But for one of the strongest doctrinal and theoretical justifications for declaring
a constitutional amendment unconstitutional in the specific context of the Indian Con-
stitution, see SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A
STUDY OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE 164– 229 (2009).
7. Elsewhere, I develop these three grounds for invalidating a constitutional amend-
ment. See Richard Albert, The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendment in Canada, 41 QUEEN’S L.J. 153, 182– 203 (2015).
8. See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments - The Migration and
Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 670– 710 (2013).
9. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV. 863, 880
(2013).
10. See Richard Albert, The Cult of Constitutionalism, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373,
382– 83 (2012); see also Qianfan Zhang, A Constitution Without Constitutionalism? The
Paths of Constitutional Development in China, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 950 (2010) (exploring
this phenomenon with respect to China).
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unconstitutional constitution.  Each conception draws from the lived expe-
rience of four constitutional traditions each with a codified constitution
today: the Constitutions of Canada, Mexico, South Africa and the United
States.  The takeaway is not that these constitutions should be declared
unconstitutional in law or legitimacy, but rather that we can mine these
constitutional traditions for insights into what it might mean to describe a
constitution as unconstitutional. Despite their unconstitutionality in differ-
ent senses of the concept, each constitution is nonetheless rooted in democratic
foundations.  The strength of these foundations, however, varies as to each.
I begin in Part II by revisiting the illegality of the United States Consti-
tution, the national constitution that replaced the Articles of Confedera-
tion, America’s first constitution.  The process of proposing and adopting
the Constitution violated the rules of change in the Articles of Confedera-
tion but its subsequent popular ratification legitimated the break with the
rules in the Articles.  In Part III, I turn to the South African Constitution,
whose previous iteration had been declared unconstitutional by the Consti-
tutional Court in a peculiar two-step certification procedure.  Part IV
focuses on the Constitution of Canada, perhaps the world’s most resistant
to major formal amendment, and as a result the one most problematic from
the perspective of participatory democracy.  Next, in Part V, I explore a
curious rule in the Mexican Constitution that seeks to make the Constitu-
tion irreplaceable by denying the validity of any new constitution that
rebels might adopt.  Throughout each Part, I discuss the possible demo-
cratic justifications for the constitution’s unconstitutionality.  I show that
each instantiation of an unconstitutional constitution traces its roots to
democratic foundations, albeit of variable strength.  My purpose in this
Article is to complicate our understanding of an unconstitutional constitu-
tional amendment with the idea of an unconstitutional constitution, an
understudied but fascinating possibility.
II. The United States Constitution and Constitutional Formality
There have been two master-text national constitutions in the United
States.11  The first was the Articles of Confederation, adopted by the Conti-
nental Congress in 1777 shortly after the Declaration of Independence.
The Articles were ratified by all thirteen states in 1781 and remained in
force until 1789, when the new United States Constitution became effective
upon its own ratification, this time by only nine states.12  The ratification
of Constitution was valid when judged on its own terms, but it was not
when judged against the rules of change in the Articles.
11. See Donald S. Lutz, The Articles of Confederation as the Background to the Federal
Republic, 20 PUBLIUS 55, 57 (1990) (describing the Articles as the “first national consti-
tution of the United States”).
12. See U.S. CONST., art. VII (1787) (“The ratification of the conventions of nine
states, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the states so
ratifying the same.”).
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A. America’s Second Founding
The Articles of Confederation entrenched an onerous formal amend-
ment rule requiring the unanimous support of all states to alter their text.
There were three operating principles to the amendment rule: inviolability,
perpetuity, and unanimity.  The Articles bound the states to adhere “invio-
lably” to them, an admonition that mirrored similar obligations in some of
the state constitutions at the time.13  The Articles also envisioned their
own “perpetuity,” though of course no constitution can ensure its own sur-
vival in the face of popular will to the contrary.14  The final element was
the high amendment threshold; the Articles required the consent of “the
legislatures of every State” for any change.  The provision in full reflects
each of these three elements:
And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every
State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a
Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legisla-
tures of every State.15
Amending the Articles under this unanimity threshold was thought to
be virtually impossible,16 and indeed in reality it was, no constitutional
amendment having ever been adopted.17  The lack of even a single amend-
ment to the Articles was not for lack of trying.  As early as July 1781—
within five months of the ratification of the Articles— the Continental Con-
gress instructed a committee “to prepare an exposition of the Confedera-
tion, a plan for its complete execution, and supplemental articles.”18
Although the committee submitted its report shortly thereafter in August—
and recommended several changes to the Articles— no amendments were
made.19  The same outcome followed for all other amendment proposals.20
13. See, e.g., MD. CONST., art. XXXVIII (1776); S.C. CONST., art. XLIII (1778).
14. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty 70 (2010).
15. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII (1781).
16. See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Con-
federation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 299– 300 n.159 (1997).
17. Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Consensus and Continuity— 1776– 1878, 38 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1958).
18. 20 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 773 (July 20, 1781) (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1912).
19. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 894– 96 (Aug. 22, 1781) (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1912).
20. See 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 112– 13, 124– 25 (Feb. 3, 1781)
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912) (proposing congressional power to collect import duties); 20
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 469– 71 (Mar. 12, 1781) (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1912) (proposing congressional power over states); 20 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 257– 59 (Apr. 18, 1783) (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912) (proposing temporary grant
to congressional power to collect import duties and requesting supplementary funds
from states); 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 260 (Apr. 18, 1783) (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1922) (proposing expense-sharing for common defense or general welfare
according to population); 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 317– 22 (Apr. 30,
1784) (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928) (proposing temporary grant of congressional power for
fifteen years to regulate commerce with the states, and requiring the assent of only nine
states); 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 201– 05 (Mar. 28, 1785) (John C.
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The veto that each state could exercise under the Articles ultimately pro-
voked the convening of an extraordinary assembly to find a way to fix the
Articles.21
The Continental Congress prepared precise instructions for the state
delegates who would gather in Convention in Philadelphia to repair the
Articles.22  Delegates were to gather for one purpose alone: “revising” the
Articles in order to preserve the Union.  The resolution instructing Conven-
tion delegates on their authorized function does not appear to leave open
the constitutional possibility of adopting an altogether new constitution
because it stresses that delegates have one “sole and express purpose”:
Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that on the second
Monday in May next a Convention of delegates who shall have been
appointed by the several States be held at Philadelphia for the sole and
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to
Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein
as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States render the
federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the pres-
ervation of the Union.23
Note here the insistence that the Convention must report its recommenda-
tions for revising the Articles to both Congress and the states.  Note also
that its recommended “alterations and provisions therein” must be
approved by both Congress and the states in order to become effective, just
as was required under the unanimity provision to formally amend the
Articles.
These instructions from the Continental Congress suggest one per-
spective in the debate between Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar on
whether the second founding was illegal.  Ackerman understands the Con-
vention as a formally illegal construction that nonetheless enhanced rather
than undermined its authority, given its origins in the legally defective par-
liament that had presided over the Glorious Revolution of 1688.24  For
Amar, however, America’s second founding was legal because there was no
constitution to violate: in his view, the Articles were a treaty among thir-
teen states and any state could legally exercise its power to rescind the
confederal compact.25  As a matter of self-perception, however, the
declared view of the Congress appears in the text of its instructions to dele-
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933) (proposing to give Congress permanent and broader powers of the
regulation of commerce); 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 494– 98 (Aug. 7,
1786) (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934) (proposing seven additional Articles to the Articles
of Confederation).
21. See Sanford Levinson, “Veneration” and Constitutional Change: James Madison
Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 2443,
2448– 49 (1990).
22. George D. Harmon, The Proposed Amendments to the Articles of Confederation, 24
S. ATLANTIC Q. 298, 435 (1925).
23. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 74 (Feb. 21, 1787) (Roscoe R. Hill
ed., 1936).
24. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 174– 75 (1991).
25. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 465– 66 (1994).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-2\CIN201.txt unknown Seq: 7  2-OCT-17 9:31
2017 Four Unconstitutional Constitutions 175
gates.  The Articles did not constitute a treaty but rather a constitution— the
Congress spoke of their “federal Constitution,” whose text the Convention
would propose to revise with a view to the “preservation of the Union.”
The answer to whether the Articles were a constitution suggests why it
is possible to state that the United States Constitution was unconstitu-
tional.  From the perspective of the Articles in force at the time of the Phila-
delphia Convention, the process that generated the second founding did
not conform to the rules of change entrenched in the existing constitution.
Those rules in the Articles of Confederation required that, in order to be
valid, any proposed change to the Articles— the revisions that the Continen-
tal Congress had authorized the Philadelphia Convention to propose— first
be approved by the Continental Congress itself and subsequently by each
of the state legislatures.  Yet the Continental Congress neither approved nor
disapproved the draft constitution that the Convention later sent to it.26
The decision was made simply to convey to each of the states a copy of the
report of the Convention along with its accompanying resolutions.27  Nor
did the states ultimately approve the new constitution by unanimous agree-
ment; the new constitution became effective when, as indicated in the text
of the proposed constitution, nine out of the thirteen states approved it.28
On at least these two counts, then, the adoption of the second constitution
violated the formal terms of the first.  There is a further point to note in the
debate on whether the new constitution was illegal: the proposed constitu-
tion violated the constitutions of many states.  Some of the state constitu-
tions prohibited the gathering of a convention outside of very strict time
intervals— none of which corresponded to the Philadelphia Convention’s
call for a series of state conventions in 1787.29  And yet the conventions
were held.
B. The Legitimating Ratification
But constitutionality in this formal sense operates on a different plane
from legitimacy.  The state conventions that ratified the proposed constitu-
tion served a dual purpose, the second just as important as the first.  The
first purpose was rooted in ratificatory legality.  Legality here was evalu-
ated from the perspective of the proposed constitution, not from the per-
spective of the Articles, since the ratification of the new constitution was
not in conformity with the legal requirements of change entrenched in the
Articles.  The ratification threshold entrenched in the proposed constitu-
tion required a supermajority of states to approve the change, a difficult
threshold but quite considerably lower than the unanimity threshold the
26. See 1 JAMES SCHOULER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION 54 (1882).
27. 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 544 (Sept. 27, 1787) (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1914).
28. U.S. CONST., art. VII.
29. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 36– 38 (1998).
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Articles required for its own amendment.30  The state conventions ulti-
mately satisfied these conditions to replace the Articles with the Constitu-
tion.  The state of New Hampshire became the ninth to ratify in June 1788,
and the Constitution came into force in March 4, 1789.31  The state con-
ventions therefore served, in the first instance, the functional purpose of
ratification.
The second purpose of the state conventions was legitimation.  The
draft constitution, were it to be adopted, had to be founded on the people
themselves and not on their state governments, both because the states
could not agree among themselves and also because the people’s consent
would give the document a higher authority.32  Legitimacy would come
from the process of ratification, endowing the ratified constitution with a
thick popular or sociological legitimacy rather than a thin legal legitimacy,
the latter of which had been forfeited when the Continental Congress trans-
mitted the proposed constitution to the states for their deliberations in
defiance of the formal rule of change in the Articles.  As Jack Rakove
explains, “Madison understood that a constitution adopted through some
process of popular ratification could be said to have attained a superior
authority” than the state legislative approval that had sanctioned the Arti-
cles and the state constitutions.33
This superior authority derived from the popular consent expressed in
the extraordinary forum of a constitutional convention, a form of revolu-
tionary deliberation and decision-making whose product is validated by
the very process of convention.  With ratification eventually achieved, “the
result was that the Constitution was regarded as the product of a process in
which the ultimate source of legitimacy, the sovereignty of the people, was
expressed as fully and as clearly as the accepted political beliefs and insti-
tutions of the time allowed.”34  The successful ratification of the Constitu-
tion suggests that the consent of the governed is a necessary and sufficient
condition for its legitimacy.35  But the Constitution took a unique path to
its legitimacy: it won popular authority not in a normal election but rather
over the course of a long and complex dialogue among federal and state
institutions, as well as political elites and ordinary citizens.36
30. U.S. CONST., art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same.”).
31. There is, however, some doubt about when the Constitution became effective as
law. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Became Law?, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2001).
32. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776– 1787 532 (2d
ed. 1998).
33. Jack N. Rakove, Constitutional Problematics, circa 1787, in CONSTITUTIONAL CUL-
TURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 41, 65 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001).
34. Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 75
(1987).
35. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1805 (2005).
36. ACKERMAN, supra note 29, at 85. R
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The ratifying convention was a peculiarly American institution,
reimagined from what had historically been an unrepresentative and spon-
taneous body into the democratic and institutionalized one it became when
it was created to write state constitutions and later to ratify the United
States Constitution.37  This institution was rooted in the exercise of what
Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal have called “quasi-direct democracy.”38
The convention did not ask voters to express themselves in quite the same
way as they would in a popular referendum nor was the convention itself a
purely representative body.  Instead, voters were to cast ballots for dele-
gates who would gather in the convention with a mandate from the people,
some delegates having campaigned for or against ratification, and others
having been publicly uncommitted.39  Ackerman and Katyal explain that
the objective had been to organize a “deliberative plebiscite”:
The convention mode, in short, represented a distinctive mix of popular will
and elite deliberation.  On the one hand, debate and decisions in the electo-
ral campaign pushed the convention in a definite direction.  On the other,
the delegates still had leeway to debate and refine the nature of the “man-
date” that their success at the polls represented.  The Federalists were trying
for the best of two worlds— combining the popular involvement of “direct
democracy” with the enhanced deliberation of “representative democracy.”
The aim, in short, was for a deliberative plebiscite.40
The opportunity for popular deliberation would be critical because of
what the Federal Convention was asking of the states: to violate the formal
rules of constitutional amendment in the Articles.  By inviting the people to
deliberate on the draft constitution, the question was transformed from a
narrow inquiry about the legality of breaking with the Articles into a larger
reflection on what would best serve the people and the republic.  The out-
come was not fated to be what it ultimately became, however, because “if
the citizenry found the illegality really troubling, they would simply elect
so many Antifederalist delegates to the convention that the Constitution
would be doomed.”41  As Madison wrote, given that the new constitution
“was to be submitted to the people themselves, the disapprobation of this
supreme authority would destroy it for ever; its approbation blot out all
antecedent errors and irregularities.”42  These state constitutional conven-
tions for deliberation and debate on ratifying the draft constitution allowed
supporters to “go on the offensive and deny that the Antifederalists’ legalis-
tic objections could be appropriately invoked to prevent a convention of the
People from deliberating its fate.”43  In the end, the ratification of the con-
stitution made its formal unconstitutionality inconsequential.
37. See ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS
AND LIMITATIONS 1– 11 (1987).
38. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
475, 562 (1995).
39. Id. at 563.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 562.
42. The Federalist No. 40, at 265– 66 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
43. Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 38, at 562. R
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III. The South African Constitution and Constitutional Values
The year 2016 marked the twentieth anniversary of the revolutionary
constitution of South Africa, a document rooted in the aspiration to trans-
form the state from apartheid to democracy. Described as the “world’s
leading example of a transformative constitution,”44 the Constitution
entrenches a commitment to founding values like “non-racialism” and
“non-sexism,” as well as “human dignity, the achievement of equality and
the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”45  The Bill of Rights enu-
merates several protected classes, including “race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disa-
bility, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”46  As Bruce
Ackerman has written, this historic Constitution promised a “new political
beginning.”47  The South African Constitutional Court has helped make
good on this promise with its principled and strategic judgments.48  But
the new South African Constitution did not have the most auspicious
beginnings.
A. The Certification Decision
On September 6, 1996, the Constitutional Court declared the new
draft constitution unconstitutional.49  The Court declared nine of its provi-
sions invalid.50  One provision violated the right to collective bargaining,51
two gave too broad a protection from judicial review to an ordinary stat-
ute,52 another failed to adequately entrench rights and to provide special
procedures for amendment,53 and another gave insufficient protection for
the independence and impartiality of two important democracy-enhancing
bodies, the Public Protector and the Auditor-General.54  The Court judged
the Constitution deficient also because one provision had failed to protect
the independence and impartiality of the national Public Service Commis-
sion and had also failed to recognize and promote provincial autonomy.55
The Court invalidated two other provisions for not properly creating or
limiting the powers of local government,56 and it also determined that the
Constitution did not properly balance the distribution of powers between
44. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 224 (2002).
45. S. AFR. CONST., ch. 1, § 1 (1996).
46. Id. at ch. 2, § 9(3).
47. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 783
(1997).
48. See THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL COURT, 1995– 2005 143– 90 (2013).
49. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Case CCT
23/96 (Sept. 6, 1996).
50. Id. at para. 482.
51. Id. at para. 69.
52. Id. at paras. 149– 50.
53. Id. at paras. 152– 59.
54. Id. at paras. 161– 65.
55. Id. at paras. 170– 77, 274– 78, 381– 90
56. Id. at paras. 299– 380.
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the national and provincial governments.57  The Court’s decision to rule
the constitution unconstitutional was seen at the time as “a unique juris-
prudential and political event in the world.”58
The Court exercised its extraordinary power of judicial review consis-
tent with a constitutional grant of authority in the Interim Constitution of
South Africa.  Recognizing that this was an exceptional arrangement, the
Court described the mandate it had been given by the Interim Constitution
as a legal duty not a political one.59  Its own function, the Court wrote, was
not “to express an opinion on any gaps in the [new constitution], whether
perceived by an objector or real.”60  The Court understood its function to
have been “clearly spelt out in [the Interim Constitution]: to certify
whether all the provisions of the [new constitution] comply with the [con-
stitutional principles].”61  Therefore, for the Court, the task of evaluating
the constitutionality of the Constitution was well within its judicial capac-
ity.  As it undertook its analysis, the Court stressed that it would approach
this role with little deference to the Constitution because the text had no
special claim to correctness or constitutionality:
Compiled as it was by the un-mandated negotiating parties, [the new consti-
tution] has no claim to lasting legitimacy or exemplary status. The [Consti-
tutional Assembly], composed of the duly mandated representatives of the
electorate, was entrusted with the onerous duty of devising a new constitu-
tion for the country, unfettered by the provisions of the [Interim Constitu-
tion] other than those contained in the [constitutional principles].62
In the final analysis, much of the new Constitution survived the Court’s
review.  The Court acknowledged that “constitution making is a difficult
task,”63 and although it did find some parts of the Constitution unconsti-
tutional, the Court urged a “focus on the wood, not the trees,” recognized
the “monumental achievement” of the Constitutional Assembly in writing
the new constitution, and otherwise insisted that “in general and in respect
of the overwhelming majority of its provisions” the new constitution was
sound.64  The Court evidently sought somewhat to downplay the effect of
its judgment, but the outcome of its exercise of judicial review was ines-
capable: as then-Justice Albie Sachs wrote, “this Court of which I’m proud
to be a member, declared the Constitution of South Africa to be
unconstitutional.”65
57. Id. at paras. 471– 81.
58. Albie Sachs, The Creation of South Africa’s Constitution, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
669, 669 (1997).
59. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, supra note
49, at para. 27. R
60. Id. at para. 30.
61. Id.
62. Id. at para. 29.
63. Id. at para. 31.
64. Id.
65. Albie Sachs, South Africa’s Unconstitutional Constitution: The Transition from
Power to Lawful Power, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1249, 1257 (1997).
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B. The Certification Process
The conventional theory of constitution-making would resist a court
declaring a constitution unconstitutional.  And perhaps with good reason,
since a constitution is often the product of deliberative procedures that in
various ways both directly and indirectly engage the people whom the text
will govern in dialogue and consultation.66  This relationship between the
governed and governors is hierarchical: the governed are the principals,
and they provisionally authorize their agent governors to govern until the
governed assert their democratic right to replace them as governors or
invoke their sovereign right to rewrite the constitution.  It is therefore
inconsistent with the idea of the people as sovereign for a court to declare a
constitution unconstitutional, the constitution being a product of the peo-
ple’s sovereign choice and deliberation, whether delegated or direct.  But
the analysis is different where the people have either directly or indirectly
authorized the court to exercise this extraordinary power.
Despite appearances, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
South African Constitution is more consistent than not with the conven-
tional theory of constitution-making.  It is true that the Constitutional
Court’s eventual ruling was rooted, as Gary Jacobsohn has put it, in the
delegation of a judicial power “as extraordinary as it was unprecedented: to
legitimate (or not) a governing code by which a people commit to the struc-
turing of a constitutional way of life.”67  This was literally an unprece-
dented moment because never before had a court been given the power to
certify the constitutionality of a new constitution.68  One might well ques-
tion, as Ran Hirschl has done in his account of constitutional revolutions,
why political actors did not contest the idea of the certification process, a
decidedly unconventional part of the South African constitutional transi-
tion.69  But although the Court’s ruling may have been unconventional, it
was not undemocratic.  The Interim Constitution itself— written in 1993
and effective as of 1994 pending the adoption of the final constitution—
authorized the Certification process, and the extraordinary role of the
Court within it:
The new constitutional text passed by the Constitutional Assembly, or any
provision thereof, shall not be of any force and effect unless the Constitu-
tional Court has certified that all the provisions of such text comply with the
Constitutional Principles [agreed to by the Constitutional Assembly].
A decision of the Constitutional Court [ ] certifying that the provisions of
the new constitutional text comply with the Constitutional Principles, shall
66. See Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 201, 208 (2009).
67. GARY J. JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 118– 19 (2010).
68. Id.  There was, however, one related precedent in Namibia, whose Constitution
was written under the constraint of principles established in a resolution of the Security
Council of the United Nations. See Matthew Chaskalson & Dennis Davis, Constitution-
alism, the Rule of Law, and the First Certification Judgment: Ex Parte Chairperson of the
Constitutional Assembly in Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa 1996, 1996(4) SA 744 (CC), 13 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 430, 430– 31 (1997).
69. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 186 (2004).
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be final and binding, and no court of law shall have jurisdiction to enquire
into or pronounce upon the validity of such text or any provision thereof.70
The Interim Constitution listed thirty-four items identified as “constitu-
tional principles,” though most of them read more like rules than princi-
ples.71  For example, one principle insisted that “amendments to the
Constitution shall require special procedures involving special majori-
ties.”72  Another provided that “formal legislative procedures shall be
adhered to by legislative organs at all levels of government.”73  The thirty-
third item stipulated that “the Constitution shall provide that, unless Parlia-
ment is dissolved on account of its passing of a vote of no-confidence in the
Cabinet, no national election shall be held before 30 April 1999.”74  Each
was written as a rule or as a set of instructions to the Constitutional Assem-
bly charged with writing the new constitution.  Writing them as rules—
rules designed to protect principles like the separation of powers, judicial
independence and non-discrimination— thereafter allowed the Court to
review the proposed text against the expectations that the Interim Consti-
tution had set for the new constitution.
The choice to give the Constitutional Court the power to judge the
constitutionality of the new constitution was the result of a compromise
reinforced by political agreement.  The National Party believed in the need
for legal continuity and minority guarantees,75 hence its endorsement of a
process that put the responsibility on the Court to guarantee that the new
constitution entrenched and protected fundamental rights, not the least of
which were property rights;76 and the African National Congress secured
the democratic constitutional assembly it had hoped would write the new
constitution, though the body would be constrained by the agreed-upon
constitutional principles.77  The entire process unfolded in two stages:
first, there would be an Interim Constitution along with democratic elec-
tions to form a new government and a new legislature that would double as
a constitutional assembly; second, the assembly would write the final con-
stitution, whose conformity with the constitutional principles in the
Interim Constitution would be judged by the Court.78  The product of this
innovative process illustrates Tom Ginsburg’s insurance theory of judicial
review.  Conferring upon the Court the power to review the new constitu-
tion, and thereafter to be its authoritative interpreter, helped resolve a dead-
lock between the incumbent and ascendant parties.  The Court’s role
assured the party in decline that there would be an impartial forum where
70. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., ch. 5, § 71(2)– (3) (1994).
71. Id. at Schedule Four.
72. Id. at Schedule Four, art. XV.
73. Id. at Schedule Four, art. X.
74. Id. at Schedule Four, art. XXXIII.
75. HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 109 (2000).
76. Id.
77. See id. at 109– 10.
78. See HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
223 (2010).
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it could raise its future grievances with recourse to an entrenched bill of
rights.79
This two-stage process is the key to the democratic legitimacy of the
Court’s ruling that the new constitution was unconstitutional.  The Interim
Constitution had become law as the final act of the pre-democracy parlia-
ment.80  But this transitional constitution— and its grant of power to the
Court— was the culmination of a negotiated agreement between the major
parties,81 a “solemn pact” to quote the words of the Interim Constitution
itself.82  The constitutional principles, too, had been settled by the negoti-
ating parties, not chosen by the pre-democracy parliament.83  The new
constitution was later written by the first democratically elected parliament
in its role as Constitutional Assembly, and it is this body that would be
constrained to write the Constitution consistent with the principles in the
Interim Constitution.84  When the Court ultimately ruled on the draft, it
was acting at the instruction and with the authorization of political parties,
as representatives of the people, and the Court enforced the principles that
had been chosen by these same political parties with the support of their
constituencies.  The connection between the Court’s ruling and the people
themselves is therefore closer than one might think when confronted by the
thought of a court declaring a constitution unconstitutional.
Afterward, under the terms of the Interim Constitution, the Constitu-
tional Assembly was required to revise the draft constitution into compli-
ance with the Court’s ruling.  The Assembly rewrote the text and again sent
it to the Court for its certification.  This time, in December 1996, the Court
held the new constitution constitutional,85 and it was soon afterwards
signed into law, bringing the formal process of constitution-making in
South Africa to a close.86
IV. The Canadian Constitution and Constitutional Democracy
Virtually all of the world’s codified constitutions entrench formal
amendment procedures that authorize alterations to their text.87  It is not
uncommon for them to also entrench limits to formal amendments, mak-
ing certain rules formally unamendable, even where large supermajorities
79. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 55– 56 (2003).
80. IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY’S PLACE 184 (1996).
81. See MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE UNITED STATES 32– 35 (2009).
82. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., prmbl. (1993).
83. See Christina Murray, A Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa’s Final
Constitution, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. Rev. 809, 813– 14 (2001).
84. Id.
85. Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, Case CCT 37/96 (4 Dec. 4, 1996).
86. For a useful review of the drafting of the Constitution, see Jeremy Sarkin, The
Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J.
COMP. L. 67, 67– 77 (1999).
87. See Francesco Giovannoni, Amendment Rules in Constitutions, 115 PUB. CHOICE
37, 37 (2003).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-2\CIN201.txt unknown Seq: 15  2-OCT-17 9:31
2017 Four Unconstitutional Constitutions 183
may wish to amend them.88  For example, the French Constitution makes
republicanism and territorial integrity unamendable,89 the Brazilian Con-
stitution makes federalism unamendable,90 and the German Basic Law
famously makes human dignity unamendable.91  Formal unamendability
has grown from a feature common to fewer than twenty percent of the
world’s constitutions from 1789 to 1944, to roughly one quarter of consti-
tutions from 1945 and 1988, to over half of all new constitutions since
1989.92  The Constitution of Canada is something of an outlier for not
entrenching any formally unamendable constitutional provision.93  But the
Canadian Constitution does, however, entrench an unusual form of
unamendability that I have elsewhere described as “constructive
unamendability.”94
A. Constructive Unamendability
A constitution is constructively unamendable where the present politi-
cal climate makes it practically unimaginable for constitutional actors to
assemble the required supermajorities to pass a constitutional amendment.
Unamendability on these terms therefore derives neither from formal con-
stitutional design as in the case of Brazil, France, or Germany described
above, nor does it derive from constitutional interpretation, as in India,
where the Supreme Court has interpreted the “basic structure” of the con-
stitution to be unamendable despite there being no mention of
unamendability in the constitutional text.95  Constructive unamendability
is instead the product of constitutional politics requiring constitutional
actors to perform impossible heroics to successfully amend the constitu-
tion.  An example is the Equal Suffrage Clause in the United States Consti-
tution, which guarantees that “no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”96  The Clause authorizes a
change to a state’s representation in the Senate only if that state grants its
consent— but no state would consent to a change that resulted in the direct
or relative diminution of its power in American federalism.97  Constructive
88. See Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 913, 950– 52 (2014).
89. FRANCE CONST., tit. XVI, art. 89 (1958).
90. CONSTITUIC¸A˜O FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] artigo 60 (Braz.). http://www.law
.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Final_GFILC_pdf.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8QH4-L6V5].
91. GERMAN BASIC LAW, tit. VII, art. 79(3) (1949).
92. See ROZNAI, supra note 1, at 20– 21.
93. See Albert, supra note 7. R
94. Richard Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States, 67
SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 181 (2014).
95. See text accompanying supra note 1.
96. U.S. CONST., art. V.
97. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1042– 45 (2014).  Sandford Levinson argues, correctly in my view,
that one could read the Equal Suffrage Clause as requiring the unanimous consent of all
states, not only of that state whose representation is diminished. See Sanford Levinson,
The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 107, 122 n.32
(1996).
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unamendability, then, is not a legal fact but rather a political reality that
prevents formal change.
The Constitution of Canada is today constructively unamendable on
all matters of national importance that touch upon federal-provincial rela-
tions.  These are what Peter Russell understands as the kinds of changes
that are achievable only through “mega constitutional politics,” a term he
uses to refer to major formal amendments that “address the very nature of
the political community on which the constitution is based,” that have a
“tendency to touch citizens’ sense of identity and self-worth,” and that are
“concerned with reaching agreement on the identity and fundamental prin-
ciples of the body politic.”98  Even with this definition of the term, it is
difficult to identify precisely which amendable matters require the popular
mobilization that mega constitutional politics entail.  Fortunately, the esca-
lating structure of constitutional amendment in the Canadian Constitution
identifies many of the amendable matters that require constitutional actors
to engage in mega constitutional politics.  This structure is escalating
because the text creates multiple procedures to formally amend the consti-
tution, each procedure expressly designated for amending only specific
categories of provisions or principles, each imposing a higher threshold for
an amendment, and each in comparison to the other’s degree of entrench-
ment reflecting the relative importance of the amendable matter.99
There are five formal amendment procedures in Canada,100 though
only two authorize the kind of major amendment that is currently impossi-
ble.  The three amendment procedures that are readily useable are the uni-
lateral provincial procedure, the unilateral federal procedure and the
multilateral regional procedure.  Under the unilateral provincial procedure,
“the legislature of each province may exclusively make laws amending the
constitution of the province.”101  The federal unilateral procedure autho-
rizes the Parliament of Canada to formally amend the Constitution “in rela-
tion to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of
Commons.”102  This procedure is available for a narrow class of matters
involving Parliament’s internal constitution, for instance subjects like par-
liamentary privilege, legislative procedure, and the number of Members of
Parliament.103  The multilateral regional procedure applies to amendments
that affect “one or more, but not all, provinces” for instance an amendment
to boundaries between provinces or the use of English or French within a
98. See PETER RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A SOVER-
EIGN PEOPLE 75 (1992).
99. See Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59
MCGILL L.J. 225, 247– 48 (2013).
100. Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada, ss. 38– 49, Part V of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11  (hereinaf-
ter “Constitution Act, 1982”).
101. Constitution Act, 1982., pt. V, s. 45.
102. Id. at s. 44.
103. Ian Greene, Constitutional Amendment in Canada and the United States, in CONSTI-
TUTIONAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 249, 251 (Stephen L. Newman ed.,
2004).
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province.104  Under this procedure, approval resolutions are required from
both the House of Commons and the Senate, as well as the provincial legis-
lature or legislatures affected by the amendment.105
Modern history has proven the other two amendment procedures
unusable, making the matters assigned to each procedure today construc-
tively unamendable.  The first— the multilateral default procedure— must be
used to amend all parts of the Constitution not otherwise assigned to
another procedure.106  This default procedure requires approval from both
houses of Parliament and from the provincial assemblies of at least seven of
Canada’s ten provinces,107 with the qualification that the population of the
ratifying provinces must amount to at least half of the total provincial pop-
ulation.108  Although it serves as the default procedure for amending the
Constitution of Canada, this procedure is also designated as the exclusive
amendment procedure for specific items, including proportional provincial
representation in the House of Commons, Senate powers and provincial
representation, Senator selection and eligibility, certain features of the
Supreme Court of Canada, and the creation of new provinces.109  The sec-
ond amendment procedure that modern history has proven unusable— the
unanimity procedure— requires approval from both the House of Commons
and the Senate as well as from each of the provincial assemblies.110  Con-
stitutional actors must use this procedure for amendments to the structure
and institutions of Canada’s constitutional monarchy, namely the office of
the Queen, Governor General, and Lieutenant Governor; the use of English
or French subject to the amendments possible through the multilateral
regional procedure; the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada sub-
ject to the amendments made possible through the multilateral default pro-
cedure; a specific ratio of provincial representation in the House of
Commons to provincial representation in the Senate; and the entire struc-
ture of the amendment rules themselves.111
Both procedures collectively have been successfully used only once
since their entrenchment in 1982, and that single use occurred in 1983,112
arguably on the strength of the momentum generated by the patriation of
the Constitution the year before.  Since then, Canada has lived two spectac-
ular failures to make large-scale amendments to the Constitution, first in
1990 with the Meech Lake Accord and then in 1992 with the Charlot-
104. Constitution Act, 1982., pt. V, s. 43.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at s. 38(1).
108. Id.
109. Id. at s. 42(1).
110. Id. at s. 41.
111. Id.
112. See Constitutional Amendment Proclamation, 1983, SI/84-102, (1984) Can. Gaz.
II, 2984.  The unilateral federal and multilateral regional amendment procedures have
been used a total of ten times. See PETER W HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, vol.
1, ch. 1 at 1– 7 n. 32 (5th ed. 2007) (loose-leaf updated 2014, release 1).
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tetown Accord.113  These two amendment packages proposed major
reforms to the most important matters in federal-provincial relations.
Their failures suggest that the Constitution of Canada may be the most
difficult democratic constitution to amend on major items, harder even
than the United States Constitution.114  Recent decisions from the
Supreme Court of Canada have further complicated formal amendment in
relation to secession,115 the Senate,116 and to the Supreme Court itself.117
The constructive unamendability of the Constitution for major
reforms is functionally, though not formally, the same as formal
unamendability.  The constitutional text of course makes nothing
unamendable— everything is at least theoretically amendable using any of
the five rules of formal amendment.  But as a matter of functional reality, I
have suggested that two of the five amendment procedures— those serving
as gatekeepers to major constitutional reforms— are today simply not suc-
cessfully deployable.  The consequence is that those matters that are theo-
retically formally amendable using those two procedures might as well be
formally unamendable because constitutional actors cannot hope to assem-
ble the supermajorities required to amend them, at least not today.
B. Constitution and Reconstitution
Unamendability is deeply problematic for democratic constitutional-
ism.  By definition, unamendability denies those governed by a constitu-
tion the power to amend it.  Even where the unamendable provisions are
worth protecting from the vagaries of constitutional politics— for instance,
all civil and political rights, as in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina118— there is a greater cost to democracy in denying the people their
power of amendment than there is to the principle that could otherwise be
violated were it not unamendable.  This trade-off is difficult if not impossi-
ble to quantify.  Yet there is a case against unamendability, and it derives
from understanding constitutionalism as rooted in participatory
democracy.119
Historically, the codification of modern constitutions and the power
of constitutional amendment have rested on the theory of popular sover-
eignty, whose fundamental teaching is that the ultimate source of constitu-
tional legitimacy is the consent of the governed.120  This poses a difficult
113. See Richard Albert, The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 53
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 399, 405– 09 (2016).
114. Richard Albert, The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 53 ALTA. L.
REV. 85, 93 (2015).
115. See Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
116. See Reference re: Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704.
117. See Reference re: Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] 1 SCR 433.
118. BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA CONST., art. X, § 2 (1995).
119. I have developed this case elsewhere. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Hand-
cuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 676– 77 (2010); Richard Albert, Counterconstitutionalism, 31
DALHOUSIE L.J. 1, 4– 5, 37 (2008).
120. LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1
(1942).
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problem for a constitution that is, or is thought to be, unamendable: If the
people have no power to update their constitution to entrench their con-
temporary values in it, can we call their constitution a constitution?  One
can view a constitution as both a verb and noun.  It is of course a docu-
ment— a thing that outlines the structures of government, defines the pow-
ers of public institutions and entrenches rights.  But it is also an action— a
continuing process of self-definition and redefinition, one that invites the
people who are to be governed by the text to both shape the rules that bind
them and to reshape them as time, experience, and evolving values might
require.  The idea of a constitution as an action derives from the Lockean
consent theory of legitimacy, which rests on the people’s acts of express
and tacit consent to validate their government.121
Understanding a constitution as a continual doing has implications
for how we prioritize the relative importance of the various forms of consti-
tutional change.122  Formal amendment is of course not the only way the
people may express their consent to a change in constitutional meaning.
But this act of constitutional alteration is rooted in predictability, trans-
parency and accountability— three democratic and participatory values of
the rule of law.123  In contrast to most of the many forms of informal
amendment— for example judicial interpretation, statutory enactment,
executive action, implication and convention124— formal amendment tele-
graphs when and how constitutional change occurs, and it usually gener-
ates widely agreed-upon textual alterations to which the people and
political actors can point as a referent for debate or action.125  An informal
amendment, however, can happen without public notice that it is occurring
at all, or indeed that it has occurred in the past, thereby undermining the
connection between the people and their constitution in its codified and
also uncodified forms.126
On this account of a constitution as an action, an unamendable consti-
tution is not only a paradox but it is also unconstitutional.  Denying the
people’s power to constitute and reconstitute themselves makes the thing
that is said to bind the people unlike what a constitution should be.  While
it is not quite in the same family of intuition that has given rise to calls to
take the constitution away from the courts127 or those in favor of weak-
form judicial review128 (or functioning parliamentary bills of rights129 or
121. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT, Book II, Ch. VIII, § 122 (Whit-
more & Fenn, 1821).
122. See Albert, supra note 4, at 38– 43.
123. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Stealth, 60 MCGILL L.J. 673, 716
(2015).
124. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1062– 71 (2014).
125. See Albert, supra note 123, at 716– 17.
126. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62 AM.
J. COMP. L. 641, 680– 84 (2014).
127. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
128. See generally MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).
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the Commonwealth model of constitutionalism130), both approaches to
constitutionalism seek to privilege more popular forms of decision-making.
Of course legitimacy need not be rooted in popular will; it may instead
derive from a less procedural and a more substantive theory of democratic
constitutionalism, one that elevates a moral reading of constitutional com-
mitments over its participatory dimensions.131  The tension between pro-
cess and content is apparent in the case of a formally unamendable
constitutional rule: the text privileges the content of the entrenched provi-
sion over the capacity of the people to change it, even if a supermajority of
constitutional actors and the people wish to abolish, rewrite or refine its
text.  This tension exists just as well for constitutions, like Canada’s, that
are constructively unamendable because the consequence is the same: the
text is unchangeable.
But the difference between a formally unamendable constitution and a
constructively unamendable one is that the latter rests on stronger demo-
cratic foundations.132  The cause of the Constitution of Canada’s
unchangeability for all but its most important parts is the political climate
that prevents the formation of the political consensus required to make an
amendment.  As a federal state that must negotiate the differences among
multiple communities and identities, and indeed among multiple
nations,133 Canada has been said to stand “at a crossroads” that will pre-
vent the population as a whole from constituting itself as one nation unless
a “certain national consciousness” emerges to bind together individuals
with dissimilar ethnic, linguistic, regional, and other identities.134  These
divisions are what led to the failure of both recent wholesale amendment
efforts in the Meech and Charlottetown Accords.135
It is in the disharmony of Canadian constitutionalism that we can
locate its democratic foundations.  The difficulty of political agreement is
what protects the Constitution.  No simple majority can transform the
terms of the federal bargain, nor even may a supermajority.  Bargain-trans-
forming changes are instead possible only with the approval and legitima-
tion of a particular configuration of political consensus that cuts across the
many nations that constitute Canada.  Major constitutional changes require
agreement not only among parliamentarians in Ottawa but also among a
129. See JANET L. HIEBERT & JAMES B. KELLY, PARLIAMENTARY BILLS OF RIGHTS (2015).
130. See STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
21– 46 (2013).
131. See James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again— Conceptions of Democracy, 25 L. &
PHIL. 533, 535 (2006); Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 399,
401– 11 (1998).
132. Although I am not persuaded, there is a case to be made that the formal
unamendability of a constitutional provision likewise rests on democratic foundations.
See Yaniv Roznai, Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking
Unamendability and Amendment Procedures, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF CON-
STITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Richard Albert et al., forthcoming 2017).
133. See JEREMY WEBBER, REIMAGINING CANADA 40– 74 (1994).
134. See Michel Seymour, Quebec and Canada at the Crossroads: A Nation Within a
Nation, 6 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 227, 237 (2000).
135. I have explored these failures elsewhere. See Albert, supra note 113.
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substantial number of legislators in provincial assemblies across the
regions of the country.
Yet there is more than this factor— the difficulty of assembling the
required parliamentary and provincial agreement— that has produced the
constructive unamendability of the Canadian Constitution.136  There also
exist other amendment rules outside the constitutional text.  Some provin-
cial laws now require legislators to consult the people in a provincial refer-
endum before ratifying an amendment proposal.137  Canada’s territories
arguably must also be consulted in these amendments as well, further
expanding the relevant communities in constitutional change.138  Political
actors must also contend with new expectations of popular participation
that confer upon previously excluded segments of the population an
important voice in any future process of constitutional renewal.139  We
could characterize these factors as restrictions on the power of constitu-
tional amendment, and indeed this has been their effect.  But in a much
deeper way, these and other factors that render the Constitution of Canada
constructively unamendable could be said to have the salutary conse-
quence of protecting the Constitution from changes without the assurance
that all of Canada’s voices have been heard.
V. The Mexican Constitution and Constitutional Legitimacy
In the Mexican tradition, revolution and constitution are distinguisha-
ble but inseparable, both as a matter of political morality and in constitu-
tional design.  The success of the country’s modern revolution in the 1910s
gave deep meaning to the 1917 Constitution.  And in turn by its entrench-
ment, the Constitution validated the revolution itself.  The Constitution
sought to “institutionalize”140 the revolution.  Its text celebrates those who
helped the cause of the Revolution, conferring upon them “and their sons,
daughters, and widows” a special “preference in the acquisition of parcels
of land” and “the right to the discounts specified by law.”141  But none of
these is the strongest expression of the Constitution’s revolutionary roots.
Its revolutionary origins are best reflected in the Constitution’s prohibition
of a new constitution.
A. Rebellion and Constitution
Like most constitutions,142 the Mexican Constitution authorizes polit-
ical actors to make formal constitutional amendments.  Two-thirds of the
136. See Albert, supra note 7. R
137. Id. at 177– 78.
138. Id. at 176.
139. Id. at 178– 79.
140. See Paul W. Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 Mich. L. Rev.
2677, 2677 (2003).
141. MEXICO CONST., trans. art. 12. (1917).
142. See Bjørn Eric Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and Constitu-
tional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY 319, 325
(Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenbord eds., 2006).
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national Congress must agree to propose an amendment, which becomes
valid when approved by a majority of the state legislatures.143  Mexico’s
formal amendment rules interestingly distinguish additions from amend-
ments, the former meaning a new writing that is added to the constitu-
tional text and the latter referring to alterations to the existing text.144  This
is an uncommon distinction in constitutional design.  What is even more
noteworthy, though, is a related section of the Mexican Constitution, enti-
tled the “inviolability of the Constitution,” a section that we can interpret as
an effort to create an irreplaceable Constitution.  The full text of this fasci-
nating provision follows below:
This Constitution shall not lose its force and effect even if its observance is
interrupted by rebellion. In the event that a government whose principles are
contrary to those that are sanctioned herein should become established as a
result of a public disturbance, as soon as the people recover their liberty, its
observance shall be reestablished, and those who had taken part in the gov-
ernment emanating from the rebellion, as well as those who cooperated with
such persons, shall be judged in accordance with this Constitution and the
laws that have been enacted by virtue thereof.145
This declaration of constitutional inviolability predates the 1917 Constitu-
tion: it was entrenched, word for word, in the 1857 Constitution of Mex-
ico.146  A similar provision appears in a few other Latin American
constitutions.147  Yet constitutional inviolability is much less prevalent
around the world than even its uncommon counterpart, the entrenchment
of the right to revolution.148
There are at least three elements of note about the Mexican Constitu-
tion’s inviolability: the Constitution’s indefinite validity, its special popular
justification, and its resistance to rebellion.  First, the Constitution
presents itself as valid indefinitely, losing neither its “force” nor “effect”
even if “a government whose principles are contrary to those that are sanc-
tioned herein” one day takes power and writes a new constitution.  This
peculiar provision on the Constitution’s “inviolability” suggests that a new
constitution would be invalid because there can be only one constitution,
and it is the 1917 text.  This highlights a second point of note: that the
Constitution is thought to be anchored in a special popular justification
that explains and perhaps also requires its indefinite validity.  The Consti-
tution creates a presumption against a new constitution.  It intimates that a
new constitution could arise only where popular will has been suppressed.
As its text states, “as soon as the people recover their liberty” the Constitu-
tion “shall be reestablished,” presupposing that the people could not
143. MEXICO CONST., tit. VIII, art. 135 (1917).
144. Id.
145. Id. at tit. IX, art. 136.
146. MEXICO CONST., tit. VIII, art. 128 (1857) (superseded).
147. See, e.g., HONDURAS CONST., tit. VII, ch. II, art. 375; PARAGUAY CONST., pt. II, tit. I,
ch. I, art. 137; VENEZUELA CONST., tit. VII, ch. I, art. 333.
148. See Tom Ginsburg et al., When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist
in the World’s Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184, 1217– 18 (2013) (finding that twenty
percent of the world’s constitutions entrench the right to resist).
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choose to be governed by a text other than the 1917 Constitution.  Finally,
this Constitution is made resistant to rebellion: “even if its observation is
interrupted by rebellion” it will remain in force throughout the rebellion
and, once order is restored “those who had taken part in the government
emanating from the rebellion, as well as those who cooperated with such
persons, shall be judged” under the 1917 Constitution.
These are high ambitions for a constitutional text.  One cannot help
but think in this context of James Madison’s cautionary words in the
debates surrounding the ratification of the proposed United States Consti-
tution.  For him, a codified constitution was but a collection of words,
“parchment barriers” as he called them, boundaries written however
clearly and definitively on paper that could never withstand “the encroach-
ing spirit of power.”149  A state governed by a codified constitutional text is
of little use in a liberal democracy without an underlying culture of consti-
tutionalism and respect for the rule of law.150  As Walter Murphy has quite
rightly observed, “to think that words can constrain power seems
foolish.”151
The asserted “inviolability” of the Mexican Constitution could be a
mere parchment barrier, or it could have some deeper meaning that in fact
exerts some constraint on those who would seek to establish a government
contrary to the Constitution.  I will return to this question further below.
But first we must answer the definitional question left open in the provi-
sion purporting to make the Mexican Constitution inviolable: what do we
mean by a rebellion?
A rebellion targets a government seen as illegitimate.152  The rebellion
can be both successful and not, and it is generally understood to be a “vio-
lent power struggle, occurring within an autonomous political system, in
which the overthrow of the regime is threatened by means that include
violence, and in which the participants are largely from the masses.”153  As
Roger Bowen explains in his account of “rebellion”:
[R]ebellion signifies much more than simple violence or “peasant discon-
tent”; rebellion represents a perhaps fatal questioning of the legitimacy of
the established order; it means that the rebels are claiming that something is
wrong with conditions as they presently exist; it means (though not always)
that the traditional grounds of obedience upon which the state rests are
149. The Federalist No. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
150. For the leading account of this paradox as it manifests itself in Africa, see
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African
Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPO-
RARY WORLD 65– 84 (Douglas Greenberg et al., eds., 1993).
151. Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3,7 (Douglas
Greenberg et al., eds., 1993).
152. TED ROBERT GURR, POLITICAL REBELLION: CAUSES, OUTCOMES AND ALTERNATIVES
247 (2015).
153. D.E.H. RUSSELL, REBELLION, REVOLUTION AND ARMED FORCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF FIFTEEN COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CUBA AND SOUTH AFRICA 62 (1974).
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being challenged.154
Mexico has a long history of rebellion, dating to the eighteenth cen-
tury,155 commonly occurring largely in its rural regions.156  Social move-
ments of many kinds were particularly frequent from the 1810s to the
1850s.157  Against this backdrop, we can understand the purpose of con-
stitutionalizing the prohibition against a constitution born of rebellion: the
1857 Constitution, which first entrenched the provision on constitutional
inviolability and later appeared in the 1917 text, “was the product of a
generation of liberals committed to the creation of a modern republic that
would halt the flood of rebellions and dictatorships that characterized the
history of this country since Independence.”158  Rebellion is therefore an
historical problem that Mexican political actors sought to address in consti-
tutional design in order to foster stable constitutionalism, whether or not
they believed the constitution’s text could in fact deter rebels from trying to
overthrow the regime.  A constitutional text quite clearly cannot prevent a
future rebellion by making ineffective a constitution borne of rebellion, as
the Constitution tries to do here.  Nonetheless, entrenching this prohibi-
tion on rebellion in the constitutional text is a statement of how strongly
the state would oppose rebellion and defend the exiting Constitution.
One possible reading of the Constitution’s declaration of its own invi-
olability is that it makes all new constitutions unconstitutional.  On this
view, declaring the 1917 Constitution inviolable— by insisting that any new
constitution borne of rebellion would be ineffective— denies the constitu-
tionality of a constitution that a successful rebellion might create.  The
argument against the validity of that new constitution would stress that the
nature of a national constitution that structures all legitimate authority is
that there can be only one effective national constitution at any given time.
This would not prevent the articulation of competing claims of authority,
as we saw in the Civil War era when the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the Confederate States made competing claims to legiti-
macy.159  The point would be that only one constitution can be the true
constitution at any single period in time, and only power and effectiveness
can determine which one rules.  This view would insist on two further
points.  First, that the 1917 Mexican Constitution is designed to preempt
154. ROGER W. BOWEN, REBELLION AND DEMOCRACY IN MEIJI JAPAN: A STUDY OF COM-
MONERS IN THE POPULAR RIGHTS MOVEMENT 5 (1984).
155. See generally MICHAEL T. DUCEY, A NATION OF VILLAGES: RIOT AND REBELLION IN
THE MEXICAN HUASTECA, 1750– 1850 (2004) (discussing the history of rebellion in the
country).
156. See generally Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico
(Friedrich Katz ed., 1988) (examining rebellion in the rural regions of Mexico).
157. See Brian Hamnet, The Comonfort Presidency, 1855-1857, 15 BULL. LATIN AM. RES.
81, 81– 82 (1996).
158. Gabriel L. Negretto & Jose´ Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Rethinking the Legacy of the
Liberal State in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina (1853– 1916) and Mexico (1857-
1910), 32 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 361, 373 2000).
159. Alison L. LaCroix, Continuity in Secession: The Case of the Confederate Constitu-
tion, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 274 (Sanford
Levinson ed. 2016).
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the contest between competing constitutions by proclaiming itself the true
constitution.  And that, by implication, the 1917 Mexican Constitution
establishes that any other constitution with a competing claim of authority
is invalid and must be treated as unconstitutional.
B. Revolution and Constitution
But perhaps there is a better reading of the Constitution’s declaration
of its inviolability.  No constitution can control how the constituent power
exercises its authority.  Nor can a constitution prevent the constituent
power from writing a new constitution.  Any act of the constituent power
recognized by political actors and the people as an act of the constituent
power is by definition valid; it is what authorizes the creation of a constitu-
tional order, what sustains it and also what legitimates it.  This is the core
of the reason why the United States Constitution was unconstitutional but
not illegitimate: the constituent power validated the violation of the Articles
in an extraordinary expression of its consent to the new constitution.
Howsoever the constituent power manifests its will, whether on a new or
revised constitution, neither the expressed will of the constituent power
nor the form that its expression takes can be illegitimate because the valid
exercise of the constituent power is the ultimate source of legitimacy for
the choices that a people makes.160
The 1917 Mexican Constitution therefore could conceivably purport
to deny the legitimacy of any new constitution that replaces it but it could
not in fact deny that new constitution its actual legitimacy.  Whatever the
constitutional text authorizes or prohibits, the people may, if they so
choose, exercise their constituent power to create a “government whose
principles are contrary to those that are sanctioned [in the 1917 Constitu-
tion].”  The choice is theirs, and indeed the 1917 Constitution recognizes
elsewhere in its text that the people may exercise their constituent power to
claim their “inalienable right” to freely create a new government:
The national sovereignty resides essentially and originally in the people.  All
public power emanates from the people and is instituted for their benefit.
The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify the form
of their government.161
This is not a grant of authority.  It is a recognition of a sociological fact of
how power is exercised and how it legitimates the law.  We might even
consider this provision redundant insofar as it is a first principle that
should everywhere be presupposed to be descriptively true.
Let us then posit that the 1917 Constitution does not intend to deny
the legitimacy of a new constitution.  The Constitution’s declaration of its
inviolability could instead mean one of two things.  First, it could mean
simply what it says: that any rebellion that temporarily suspends the con-
160. Elsewhere, I have critiqued the theory of constituent power as insufficiently
developed to explain how constitutions actually do change. See Richard Albert, Constitu-
tional Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2018).
161. MEXICO CONST., tit. II, ch. I, art. 39 (1917).
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stitution and whose leaders then govern under another constitution,
whether codified or not, will be prosecuted once order is restored by those
whom the rebellion has overthrown.  It could alternatively mean that any
new constitution that is promulgated by rebels claiming to speak for the
people, but without actually having their support, shall be invalid until the
people successfully assert their power either to restore the old constitution
or to write a new one.
Either of these alternative readings seems consistent with the 1917
Constitution, which warns would-be rebels elsewhere in the constitutional
text that:
Those who have taken part in the government that emanated from the rebel-
lion against the legitimate Government of the Republic or those who cooper-
ated with it, afterwards taking up arms or holding office or employment
with the factions that attacked the Constitutionalist Government, shall be
tried under the laws in force unless pardoned by such Government.”162
This provision of course would not apply where the rebellion that had cre-
ated a new constitution ultimately became accepted as an exercise of the
constituent power and recognized by the people as their authoritative con-
stitution.  But then it would be more appropriate to speak here of revolu-
tion rather than rebellion.  Rebellion as we understand it does not lead to a
new constitution.  When it does, we recognize retrospectively that the rebel-
lion was mislabeled or that the rebellion had transformed into something
qualitatively different that we prefer to call a revolution.  Like a rebellion, a
revolution may begin as a violent struggle for change in the regime, and it
may well be supported by a mass mobilization.  The difference is in both
process and outcome.  Rebellion is destructive whereas revolution is con-
structive; the object of the former is overthrow while in the latter it is to
found a new beginning supported by a discernible popular will that is
often though not always reflected in a new constitution.163
The logic of the 1917 Constitution’s declaration of its inviolability is
that the right of revolution cannot as a matter of positive law be established
in a constitutional text a priori, but rather that it may be established only a
posteriori when the people acknowledge that they have validly exercised
it.164  This interpretation appears in one of the leading studies of the Mexi-
can Constitution, in which the author explains in reference to this
entrenched prohibition that:
A right to revolution cannot be positively recognized because it implies dis-
owning the law.  A constitution recognizing a right for its own breach could
not be, strictly speaking, a constitution.  For this reason, the constitution of
1917, originated from the disowning of the constitution of 1857, prohibited
revolution just as the previous.
162. Id. at trans art. 10.
163. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 140 (1990).
164. See FELIPE TENA RAMI´REZ, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL MEXICANO 66– 74 (Mariana
Velasco Rivera trans., 28th ed. 1994).
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The right to revolution cannot be positive established a priori but only a
posteriori.  The law of revolution only becomes positive law when it is, explic-
itly or implicitly, acknowledged by the people.165
On one hand, this interpretation is inconsistent with the actual design of
modern constitutions, some of which entrench the right to revolution166
and others that contemplate political actors violating the constitution in a
period of declared emergency.167  On the other, these models might be
internally incoherent despite the best efforts of their designers.  Where
does this leave us?
“In a time of revolution,” Walter Bagehot wrote, “there are but two
powers, the sword and the people.”168  The incumbents wield the sword to
defend the regime while the people seek a new beginning for themselves
and their state.  In their challenge to the regime, the people exercise their
natural right to revolution,169 whether or not it is entrenched in or prohib-
ited by the constitutional text.  No constitution can as a matter of effective
constraint or compulsion authorize revolution, nor can it prohibit revolu-
tion.  A constitutional text could of course recognize the right of revolution,
as some currently do, but the people would possess this right independent
of the text.  And a constitutional text could purport to prohibit revolution,
but this would not, nor could it, prevent the people from exercising their
right.  The very nature of the revolutionary right is that it recognizes no
bounds, constitutional or not, codified or not, on when and how it begins
and unfolds nor on what it seeks to achieve.  Revolution is limited only by
the organizational capacity and collective strength of the movement that
builds behind it.
In purporting to prohibit a new constitution emerging out of rebellion,
the Mexican Constitution should not be misunderstood as prohibiting a
constitution emerging out of revolution, the difference being that the for-
mer is not approved, reinforced or acquiesced to by the people but the lat-
ter is.  Nor should we understand the prohibition on a new constitution
born of rebellion as authorizing revolution, because it plainly does not
speak of revolution, nor of when, whether or how the people are to mount
their revolution.  Still, the Constitution’s declaration of its inviolability is at
its core nonetheless about revolution.  We should understand the Constitu-
tion’s prohibition on a new constitution born of rebellion as the Constitu-
tion’s recognition of the people’s right of revolution.  Where a rebellion
takes control of the government and entrenches a new but illegitimate con-
stitutional order, the Constitution urges the people to restore it by all neces-
sary means, with recourse to arms if necessary.  The prohibition then lays
out the sequence of restoration: the people shall reclaim power, the Consti-
165. Id. at 74.
166. Ginsburg et al., supra note 148.
167. See, e.g., CONSTITUIC¸A˜O FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] artigo 136 (Braz.); FIN-
LAND CONST., ch. 2, sec. 23 (1999); PHILIPPINES CONST., art. VII, sec. 18 (1987); PORTUGAL
CONST., pt. I, tit. I, art. 191 (1976); ST. KITTS AND NEVIS CONST., ch. II, sec. 19 (1983).
168. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 78 (Paul Smith ed., 2008).
169. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, Book II, ch. XVII (Whitmore & Fenn, 1821).
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tution shall then ultimately be restored, and those responsible for having
subverted the order will be held responsible for their wrongdoing under the
Constitution’s rules.  This reading of the Constitution’s declaration of its
inviolability allows us to reconcile the plain text of the prohibition with the
natural right to revolution, while also integrating into our interpretation of
the Constitution the nation’s lived history with revolution and rebellion.
VI. Unconstitutionality and Democracy
Our case studies from the United States, South Africa, Canada and
Mexico reveal how a constitution may be unconstitutional in different
senses.  Each unconstitutional constitution is nonetheless rooted in demo-
cratic foundations of different strengths.  The American case reflects a rev-
olutionary tradition that legitimates the considered judgment of the people.
The Mexican case also emerges from a revolutionary tradition, but one that
is oriented to the threat of rebellion, a common occurrence in the country’s
lived history.  The South African Constitution, in contrast, does not have
the same classical revolutionary beginnings but it does have unconven-
tional revolutionary beginnings: the transition from apartheid to democ-
racy was a democratic revolution that proceeded over a long period, with
mass mobilization yet without the violence that characterized the paradig-
matic American, French and Russian Revolutions.170  That the final out-
come in South Africa was negotiated peacefully rather than prosecuted by
conventional revolutionary means does not undermine the revolutionary
character of its outcome.  For its part, the Canadian case emerges from a
decidedly non-revolutionary tradition and reflects the idea of unconstitu-
tionality from a different direction: that a constitution, in order to be a
constitution, requires that it be susceptible to formal change when circum-
stances warrant.  Each of these four constitutional traditions suggest that a
constitution need not be constitutional to be legitimate.
There are three themes worth exploring by way of conclusion: perspec-
tive, participation and the people.  The first concerns the perspective from
which we are to evaluate the constitutionality of a constitution.  H.L.A. Hart
famously distinguished between the internal and external points of view,
the former held by political actors within the legal system and the latter
held by outsiders to it.171  From an internal perspective, the United States
Constitution and the draft South African Constitution were both unconsti-
tutional, the first as a formal matter insofar as it violated the rules of
change in the Articles of Confederation and the second also as a formal
matter because the Court held that it violated the constitutional principles
against which it was to be judged.  Without denying the possibility that
political actors could view the Canadian Constitution as unconstitutional,
170. See Richard Albert, Democratic Revolutions (June 1, 2011) (unpublished BCL
dissertation, University of Oxford) (on file with author).
171. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (3d ed. 2012) (“[I]t is possible to be con-
cerned with the rules, either merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or
as a member of the group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct.  We may
call these respectively the ‘external’ and the ‘internal points of view’.”).
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it is more an external perspective that gives rise to the claim suggested here
that the Canadian Constitution is unconstitutional because it is virtually
formally unamendable in its most basic elements.  The Mexican Constitu-
tion, however, may be judged unconstitutional on both internal and exter-
nal perspectives.  The overthrown incumbents would decry the
unconstitutionality of a new constitution while the ascendant challengers
would not, the former believing that any new constitution contrary to the
old would be invalid and illegitimate while the latter would point to their
effective control as both the source of legitimacy for the new constitution as
well as the reason for its adoption.  From an outsider perspective, we can
interpret a new Mexican Constitution as both constitutional and not,
depending on whether we view the new governors as representing a new,
valid and stable popular consensus.
The second important theme is participation.  In each case, the legal
defect of unconstitutionality can be remedied by popular validation.  We
see this perhaps most clearly in the case of the United States.  Procedurally
unconstitutional, the new constitution shed all taint of illegitimacy when
the people later ratified it in extraordinary constitutional conventions.
Popular participation can also occur ex ante, as in the case of South Africa,
where the people participated via their representatives in the multi-party
drafting of the interim constitution.  The list of principles against which
the Constitutional Court was to evaluate the new constitution was therefore
imbued with the popular legitimacy generated by the drafting process for
the interim constitution.  The Mexican case similarly highlights popular
participation: the unconstitutionality of a new Mexican constitution turns
on the extent to which the people accept as legitimate what is presented to
them as a new beginning.  The closer the cause of the constitutional
replacement is to a popular revolution, the less likely the new constitution
is to be viewed as unconstitutional from the internal perspective, and
indeed from the external one as well.  In Canada, it is the barriers to suc-
cessful ratification, but not to participation itself, that makes the Constitu-
tion constructively unamendable.  But in erecting such high barriers to
ratification, the Constitution requires a massive mobilization and coordina-
tion of popular participation to change the basic bargain the Constitution
protects.
Both perspective and participation point our attention to a third
theme: the people.  The question whether a constitution can be simultane-
ously unconstitutional yet rooted in democratic foundations may be
answered only with reference to the people as the ultimate source of legiti-
mation.  Though the people are not always clearly identifiable, it is the peo-
ple who by their direct or indirect approval can validate an unconstitutional
constitution.  They may defend constitutional principles in revolution, they
may approve a constitution directly by referendum, they may grant their
consent by acquiescence, and they may delegate their power to write or
approve a constitution to officials tasked with representing their interests.
Under these forms of popular consent, the people possess an extraordinary
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power of absolution that can transform a formally unconstitutional consti-
tution into a legitimate one anchored in democratic values.
The question that motivated this inquiry to begin with is whether a
constitutional amendment can be unconstitutional.  The answer is of
course yes.  But whether an entire constitution can be unconstitutional
raises both similar and different questions.  The questions are similar
because they invite us to break free from our formalist presuppositions that
respecting the constitutional text is sufficient for constitutionality.  They
are different because the stakes are likely to be higher in the unconstitu-
tionality of a constitution as opposed to a single amendment.  Yet the vari-
ous ways that a constitution can be unconstitutional— as a matter of form
or substance, and from the perspective of participatory democracy or pop-
ular legitimacy— invite us to consider alternative grounds upon which to
declare a constitutional amendment unconstitutional, over and above the
ones that constitutional courts commonly invoke today around the world.
In light of the increasing attacks on liberal constitutionalism in states as
varied as Colombia, Ecuador, Grenada, Honduras, Hungary, Japan, Trini-
dad & Tobago, Turkey, Venezuela, and elsewhere,172 constitutional actors
may well require a new toolkit of reasons to invalidate constitutional
changes in order to protect the foundations of constitutional democracy.
Considering how a constitution can be unconstitutional may help reverse
engineer justifications for declaring an amendment unconstitutional.  I
leave for another day, however, the task of formulating these derivative jus-
tifications— and also of defending them— and repeat for now only that a
constitution may at once be unconstitutional yet nonetheless democratic.
172. See Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 655, 658– 59 (2015).
